

SECURING EU DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP AT WHAT COSTS? REFLECTIONS ON DEFENCE SPENDING BETWEEN NORTH-SOUTH AND WEST-EAST DIVERGENS¹

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***Abstract.** The events produced at the international level today demonstrate and track the recent evolution of the security environment of each member state of the European Union and beyond. The direct and indirect threats to regional and global security and stability require the taking, by the bodies empowered in this regard, of some precautionary measures and the improvement of the already existing military equipment at the level of each structure representing the military force of the states. In order to increase the sustainability and production capacity of the European Union, it is essential not only to increase, but also to optimize national and international investments in this field. This approach is necessary to achieve a significant change in strategy and to strengthen the joint capability to respond to critical needs.*

***Keywords:** defense, budgets, acquisitions, security, culture, E.U., NATO.*

Introduction

Comparing defense resources between EU Member States can be a complex process and involves various aspects, including defense budgets, military forces, technological capabilities, long-term investments in defense research and development. Some states have sizable defense budgets, representing a significant portion of their total government spending (Steinbach et al., 2024), while other states have smaller budgets, but which may be growing due to regional security concerns, especially in the current context of military crisis (Klomp, 2023).

Some member states have large and diverse military forces with extensive power projection capabilities, while others, such as small states, may have smaller but

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specialized forces focused on territorial defense (Saba et al., 2022). Countries with a developed defense industry, such as Germany, France, may have access to advanced technology and high-quality military equipment, whereas other states may depend heavily on imports to meet and maintain their defense needs (Karamanis, 2022). There are efforts within the European Union to strengthen defense capabilities through stronger collaboration and integration between member states, but there are also significant differences in threat perception and defense priorities, as Eastern European countries may have specific territorial security concerns, instead those in the South can be considered threatened by migration or economic, political, social instability (Mölling et al., 2023).

There is no doubt that the European security order has been affected by the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine. The resistance shown by European countries and their common institutions in the face of challenges and threats will be decisive in determining whether international security will be maintained. European policymakers have been increasingly concerned about what they perceive to be an increased propensity (Fiott, 2022) on the part of Russia to take risks that affect security. As far as Europe and the European Union are concerned, there is currently no alternative to maintaining the security and resilience of society. This implies the preservation of political unity and permanent, ongoing preparation to defend Europe against imminent threats. It is thus necessary for each state to increase its resistance in Europe to ensure international safety and security. However, military defense is clearly neglected in some EU member states, leading to the weakening of Europe's defense capabilities.

I. Together or apart? Individual vs. collective defence budgeting

The adoption of a geopolitical strategy regarding the provision and maintenance of a state's security leads to the implementation of a narrative of balance, power and the management of strategic competition management (Kruck et al., 2023). In the new context, where the distinction between crisis, systemic conflict and war is disappearing, the concept of level of ambition plays a minor role in national security.

Improving the synchronization of national budget provisions for the financing of defense cooperation programs and safeguarding the budget allocated to these programs are complex issues for each individual state, as each country operates according to its own regulations (Klomp, 2023) regarding annual budgets, long-term investment plans and the direction of the use of allocated funds. The concept of resource pooling is influenced by each entity's security interests and strategic partnerships. The landscape of defense spending among member states has evolved considerably with the increase in spending affected by the Russian-Ukrainian crisis.

Underlining the importance of the existence of military forces capable of resisting external aggressions, as well as the role of the management of defense resources and the alliance in shaping the development of the armament industries results from the efforts made at the level of European countries regarding the consistent investments of the last three years, as well as from the increases defense budgets, which indicates the permanent concern of the Ministries of National Defense for national and international security.

Taking into account the importance given to the development at EU level by each member state, of national resilience, with priority in the current context in which the concept of peace and war cannot be precisely defined, it is necessary to take into account hybrid threats (Fiott, 2024), being the singular actions of a state's military forces are insufficient. They must use the joint actions (Ghulam et al., 2023) of the other bodies that

are part of the civilian sector and unite the capabilities of the military field with those of other resources, including legislative ones.

The budget intended for the defense of a state can be considered a connecting pivot between two parts, that of the defense resource management system and that of forced employment. The resources needed to make up the basic structure of the military force must be increased, depending on the level of preparation and the duration of a military operation. Also, the study analyzed in this paper also reveals the fact that limiting the integrated management of defense resources to annual defense expenditures can have long-term negative consequences both on the economy of a state and on the maintenance of regional security, creating the illusion that only by increasing the financial ceiling will also obtain the safety of the respective state.

1.1.1. Resilience mechanisms during peace time: E.U., NATO

The European Union is a substantial economic mechanism oriented, mainly, towards protecting the individual. European nations showed a desire to balance and restore the world that had gone through armed conflicts that culminated in the Two World Wars between the years 1914-1918 and 1939-1945, as a result of which the entire world suffered. Thus, the foundations of the European Union were laid.

One of the most important projections of the European Union was the implementation of a security policy for the coming years that would lead to supporting, alongside N.A.T.O., the democratization of the states in its vicinity and to avoid the propagation of political instability towards the member states of the Union.

The security link of the member countries of the European Union is given, first of all, by guaranteeing the essential role of N.A.T.O. which aims to increase the internal capabilities and coherence of the states, something that must lead to increasing the efficiency of activities for the prevention and management of regional and international crises that may arise.

So, we are talking about the concept of "strategic culture" (Kruck et al., 2023) which presupposes a community of values, principles, common ideas and, above all, presupposes that all EU member states assume responsibility for risks and opportunities in order to manage crises and the international security environment.

Ensuring national security involves the corroboration of strategies, policies and tools designed to protect a nation's sovereignty, territory, population and interests from internal and external threats. Key tools (Mölling et al., 2023) commonly used to achieve national security objectives include:

- Maintaining robust military capabilities is essential to deter aggression and defend against external threats. These are armies, navies, air forces and specialized units equipped with modern attack and defense weapons and equipment;

- Diplomatic efforts are a crucial element for building alliances, encouraging international cooperation and resolving conflicts by peaceful means. Diplomatic channels are used to negotiate treaties, agreements and alliances that promote common security interests and stabilize the regions of interest of participating states;

- Intelligence agencies play a vital role in collecting, analyzing and disseminating information about potential vulnerabilities and threats to national security. In this sense, it is imperative to monitor external activities, assess all risks and provide timely information to decision-makers for establishing strategies and the decision-making process;

- Creating credible deterrence mechanisms that would cause potential adversaries to desist from threatening or attacking a nation's interests;
- Ensuring economic stability, prosperity and resilience is very important for national security and includes maintaining sound economic policies, reducing dependence on critical resources from third countries and developing a financial environment capable of producing equipment and technologies to counter possible threats and crises military.

1.1.2. Activation mechanisms during war imminences

For any member state, the harmonization of the national legislation with that of the alliances of which it is a part must represent a desire (Charotte, 2023), thereby significantly contributing to the definition and maintenance of a security environment with a very high degree of safety. Thus, it is imperative to adapt the normative and institutional framework to the dynamics of vulnerabilities and international threats, to ensure the resilience of the standards and security requirements of national infrastructures, as well as the development of national and international cooperation.

Recently, two major crises have disrupted the security environment, namely the economic crisis arising from the medical crisis of 2019-2022 (caused by the COVID 19 pandemic) and the military crisis based on the two ongoing armed conflicts in different parts of the globe, respectively in Europe, the Russian-Ukrainian war that broke out on February 24, 2022 and the Israeli-Palestinian war that broke out on October 7, 2023.

Thus, regardless of the nature or reasons for the outbreak of conflicts that can affect global security and generate instability, the reality shows that financial resources have been consumed at unimaginable levels. These are determined, on the one hand, by the funds necessary to finance the war itself, and on the other hand, by the funds necessary for the reconstruction and restoration of the global order after the end of the war, which cannot be borne exclusively by the belligerent states, in particular in the context of the emergence of an economic crisis caused by the war.

According to the Report of the United Nations Panel of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, military spending "is measured as the value of the flows of goods and services in the military sector over a full year"(United Nations, 2005).

The analysis of the determinants of military and defense spending is based, on the one hand, on the volume of funds consumed in different periods and, on the other hand, on differences between states. Thus, several questions are considered that states must find answers to, such as: What is the reason why a state has a low level of military spending? What are the reasons that cause states in the same region or area to have significantly higher expenditures than others?

The alliance of the member states of the European Union and NATO undoubtedly leads to higher expenditures on the part of the main actors for the augury of international security (Özcan, 2022). States must make substantial financial efforts given the high costs of technology in equipping today's armed forces, as well as the vulnerabilities encountered in light of current threats and challenges.

Following the Vilnius Summit in 2023, under the pressure of unfulfilled commitments and the need for resources, it was reiterated that states have committed to at least 2% of GDP in defense investment. Also at that time, the need to create a new joint body, namely the NATO-Ukraine Council, was considered, an opportunity for all allies to be on an equal footing with Ukraine in terms of promoting political dialogue,

cooperation and supporting Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership to NATO.

Data published in NATO's 2022 Annual Report indicated that only seven of the 31 allies met the criterion of spending 2% of GDP on defense. These countries are Greece, United States of America, Lithuania, Poland, United Kingdom of Great Britain, Estonia and Latvia (NATO, 2023).

Because of the complex nature of the economic factor, security and defense are influenced, as it focuses on several trajectories such as governance, revenue, budget deficit, public debt and inflation. Economic factors are the main generators of a state's economy, so that the defense budget of the respective state can be supported through the allocated financial resources. The increase in the financial investments of the states in defense and security was observed in the context of the outbreak of the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine, especially of the states in the vicinity of the conflict zone (Florișteanu, 2023).

II. Case studies in the E.U. For an efficient budgeting and mobilization

Some countries in Europe have become dependent on the peace dividend, so whether security threats are real or not, a tightening of the adjustment of spending priorities is born. While many of the state budgets in Europe show large deficits, the welfare of the state is maintained. Given the context caused by the war between Russia and Ukraine, state companies and European citizens requested financial support to compensate for the expenses caused by the increase in energy prices and inflation.

Financing defense spending through debt is only a short-term solution. As a result of events such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the financing of the defense budget from the public debt of the states is possible without the need to cut the budgets of other areas (Fiott, 2022), but this leads to the false impression that security is granted and guaranteed for free and implicitly to the reduction the pressure for budget adjustment.

II.2.1. North vs. south: evidences from Finland, Lithuania, Romania

So Finland, to ensure its security, kept conscription and continued to invest quite heavily in defense spending. The Finnish army is one of the strongest armies in Europe. Finland's reserve infantry is among the largest in Europe and artillery capacity is high by European standards. The share of military spending slightly exceeds NATO's 2% index requirement (Kivinen, 2024), which is due in particular to major investments in naval and air forces. The decision of Finland's investments in the budget of the naval and air forces was taken before the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war. The basic design of the Navy's four new battleships is nearly complete, and construction of the first assault ship is scheduled to begin in late October 2024. The Navy's first corvette-type warship will be operational in 2027. The total financing of the project is 10 billion euros. Finland's chosen F-35 is a single-engine, command center flying combat weapon platform. It can be equipped with in-hull missiles and out-of-hull weapons for both defense and offense. Finland made steps for the purchase of 64 aircraft with weapons and combat and attack systems (Kivinen, 2024).

The armed forces of Lithuania consist of land, naval, air and Special Operations Forces. Their purpose is to be the main pillar of deterrence against any threat to the nation's security. The state's defense system is based on the concept of total and unconditional defense, and the purpose of the country's defense policy is to form and prepare society for general defense. The country has resorted to restructuring the armed

forces so that one-tenth of the ground forces can be deployed at any time to take part in international operations, while half of the ground forces are prepared for deployment outside Lithuania's borders (Bankauskaitė et al., 2023). Despite all the talk of Russia's hybrid threats, Lithuania's first reaction to managing the country's defense resources was to invest in military equipment and increase its combat capabilities (Bankauskaitė et al., 2023). It initiated a vast program of military acquisitions, namely mobile artillery systems, armored vehicles, tactical combat vehicles, helicopters and tactical equipment. The state is also focusing on critical military infrastructure, so it has upgraded training grounds, military bases, but also built new ones.

Both Lithuania and the other Baltic states are jointly addressing the capability gaps in maritime and air defense in the Baltic Sea region. These states have made clear their demands for improvements in political and military decision-making, peacetime rules of engagement, and force generation procedures and requirements for effective and timely transition from air policy of NATO to their own air defense. In the current security environment and considering the imbalance of armed forces existing in the Baltic region, Lithuania's strong transatlantic connection becomes exceptionally significant for ensuring the security and defense of the entire territory.

According to published data, the Norwegian Army represents the largest branch of the Norwegian armed forces, having modern and well-trained units, being able to defend the entire surface of the territory. The Army has soldiers under its command who conduct international combat operations, guarding, security, surveillance, training and other support functions. The Norwegian Armed Forces has a total of 8,773 soldiers, and the defense budget was NOK 40.8 billion in 2021 (Bjur, 2024). With the unexpected emergence of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, there have been short-term priority changes in Norway's defense mechanisms and resources, so the government has increased the budget for peacetime vigilance, training and standing military activity, training and exercises, being necessary to replenish resources and defense reserves during wartime. Another major change was the abandonment of Norway's traditional policy of not exporting arms to countries in armed conflict (Bjur, 2024). Armed forces, including the Norwegian Intelligence Service, have focused particularly on the northern region of the territory, where the state borders Russia, and oil installations in the North Sea have enjoyed increased protection.

Romania shares the longest border with Ukraine and has faced a series of important challenges since the Russian invasion, having to respond both to the humanitarian consequences caused by this crisis and to the economic consequences following the conflict. The Romanian authorities have signaled a potential change in strategic direction as a result of the outbreak of the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Thus, in October 2023 the Supreme Defense Council of the Country, representing the main decision-making body in the defense field of Romania, emphasized the importance and necessity of developing a sovereign defense industrial base by capitalizing on EU and NATO defense instruments. Another topic on which CSAT focused its attention was the analysis of the Endowment Plan of the Romanian Army for the period 2024-2033, in order to counter the threats by increasing the quantities of ammunition necessary for the fight, as well as the gradual constitution of the costs (Albulescu, 2024). The Romanian Army will concentrate all its strategic efforts in order to strengthen the defense capacity both at the national level and within the alliances. Thus, consideration will be given to equipping the national army with high-performance military technique and equipment, compatible and interoperable with those existing in

the armies of the other EU and NATO member states. Referring to Romania, the data show that arms exports registered significant increases after the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which demonstrates the potential of the industry characterized both by the production of arms and by the country's ability to deliver to other states. For these reasons, the increase in the percentage of GDP allocated to the defense and security sector must be visible and largely dedicated to the purchase of military products designed and manufactured by domestic industry.

In the context generated by the military crisis that broke out between Russia and Ukraine, the defense industry of the EU member states reacted in a timely manner in terms of increasing the production and export of military equipment and modern military systems capable of countering Russia's offensive attacks. The analyzed data indicate that, in Romania, the increase in the export of armaments and ammunition has been achieved, with favorable conditions for the conclusion of partnerships with various companies from the Euro-Atlantic area. It was decided that a large part of the budget allocation of 2.5% GDP (Albulescu, 2024) is intended for the purchase of military equipment that meets NATO standards in order to equip the Romanian army.

II.2.2. West vs. East: Evidences from Germany, France, Poland, Spain

For Germany, the military crisis triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 meant questioning the security that had prevailed in Europe since the end of the Second World War, which led Chancellor Scholz to take the initiative to carry out security and defense changes. Thus, far-reaching changes were announced in the country's policy and, in particular, in terms of defense, i.e. the immediate stop of the construction of the Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline, the financing of 100 billion euros for the German armed forces, the provision of the national army with fighter jets F-35 (Lindholm et al., 2024) for participating in NATO actions against the nuclear threat, providing military support and aid to Ukraine, as well as adopting unprecedented sanctions against Russia. Germany wanted at all costs to avoid being perceived by Russia as an active participant in the war. One issue that was raised in this context concerned the ability of the German military, whose budget has been reduced in recent years, to meet its arms delivery quotas. Germany has also pledged to increase defense spending to 2% of GDP by 2024. In April 2023, the Ministry reported that €32 billion of the surplus budget had been allocated and earmarked for new projects aimed at purchases (Lindholm et al., 2024). Germany, for example, in terms of program and objective changes, has taken a different stance on arms deliveries, moving from a cautious emphasis on non-lethal assistance to supporting Ukraine by providing heavy weapons, namely tanks, howitzers, battle tanks, air defense systems. At the same time, Germany saw considerable increases in defense spending, with a budget surplus of 100 billion euros, which required a constitutional change and a major increase in the regular defense budget. Finally, Germany strengthened its deployment of military forces on NATO's eastern flank, including by placing permanent troops in Lithuania, abandoning the rotational deployment. Germany's industrial strength is also reflected in a vast defense industry capable of producing a wide variety of military equipment, vehicles, weapons and ammunition.

France has traditionally been the strongest supporter of European defense since the signing of the Brussels Treaty in 1948. France invested in defense during the years when many European states were reaping the dividends of peace and moving away from collective defense. This is confirmed by the fact that France's defense investments and

spending have never fallen to a low level. The French defense model has always maintained a high degree of military readiness and capability given the fact that it has always focused on crisis management. Own, long-term investment in independent nuclear deterrence has always been linked to the risk of a conflict involving a major power. France's defense resources did not require a significant transformation approach in the context of the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine, as the French forces demonstrated that the current level of training and engagement is capable of rapid deployment, demonstrating their capabilities to send military forces to Romania, while maintaining its omnipresence in Estonia and increasing its air and sea commitments to NATO and the EU in order to maintain international security.

As for Spain, military planners monitor the requirements of the new geostrategic environment created by the outbreak of the military crisis, aiming to adapt the defense concept of the armed forces and their military posture to the new context. Spain is not undertaking significant strategic assessments, and military transformation consists of adopting incremental changes in the employment of military forces and capabilities needed to address the threats and vulnerabilities created by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Spain's defense system aims to effectively manage crises, so there is a need to increase the number of units responsible for the training of the armed forces. Until now, due to existing budgetary constraints (Remiro et al., 2024), Spain has been able to provide a high level of training only to the armed forces on missions abroad and to those permanently on alert within its territory. Expanding military training capabilities requires significant investment in military mobility, logistics, and sustaining military forces' capabilities to meet armed challenges and meet new tasks. The Spanish Ministry of Defense will maintain the percentage of the country's contribution to operations aimed at ensuring international peace and security, as well as the importance of the contribution of the armed forces to security and civil protection missions (Remiro et al., 2024). At the same time, the air force belonging to the Ministry of Defense of Spain is a priority for defense and is going through a period of major restructuring and modernization. There is also a strengthening of the commitment according to which Spain will collaborate and cooperate with other European states, offering its support for the development and assurance of international security and defense.

Due to its geographical position and its potential objective, Poland is the epicenter of most processes related to securing NATO's eastern flank. Poland hosts approximately 12,000 NATO troops (Bornio, 2024) under the umbrella of unilateral and allied commitments, military infrastructure for alliance-led units, and the repositioning of ammunition and weapons to be used in the event of military tensions escalating. The large-scale invasion of Ukraine led to a considerable increase in the level of defense spending, military procurement, and the strengthening of Poland's technological and combat capabilities. In 2023, Poland allocated 3.9% of its GDP to defense spending, while in 2024 it is expected to reach the level of 4.2%, and the process of rapid militarization has been intensified (Bornio, 2024). The country acquired, among other things, American M1A1 and M1A2 tanks, increased the number of HIMARS ordered to 500, bought more than 200 Korean-sourced K2 tanks, about 600 Korean K9 howitzers, 48 FA-50 combat training aircraft and plans to start domestic production of 800 K2 tanks in the Polish version (Bornio, 2024). The Polish army currently numbers around 202,100 soldiers (Bornio, 2024), which gives Poland a considerable potential and major momentum compared to other European Union states.

III. Some solutions to the problem: increasing the industrial productivity of the defence equipment branch

For many systems in production, industrial capacity has been reduced to match demand levels in core domestic and export markets. Defense manufacturers are reluctant to invest without contracts or firm commitments from customers, given that demand may collapse again with the end of the military conflict in Ukraine. Most European states responded to Russia's invasion of Ukraine by significantly increasing defense budgets, human resources, making commitments to strengthen military capabilities by purchasing the necessary equipment often from sources outside the EU.

A comprehensive allied posture focused on collective deterrence and common defense against a common threat must be supported by adequate military stockpiles as well as adequate industrial capacity to meet this task (Bergmann et al., 2023). The problem for European countries is outlined by the fact that consistent, unexpected and prolonged military deliveries to Ukraine have reduced EU military stockpiles to a minimum.

Joint procurement programs are essential for the efficiency and accessibility of multinational solutions regarding the needs of the armed forces, including in order to develop the capabilities necessary to ensure national security. No European country, not even Germany with an extensive defense industry, has in itself a comprehensive portfolio of defense manufacturing technology capabilities in aerospace, land warfare, naval and cyber defense systems. At the European level, states pursue special interests related to industry, defense resources, which is an impediment to interoperability and the deepening of independent defense capabilities. So, the solution consists in developing and maintaining a European cooperation and coordination as close as possible, as well as in the inclusion of a consolidation of common European research in the field of defense and the management of defense resources.

Defense procurement management aims to ensure the efficient use of funds allocated for the procurement of products, services and works required by the military. An important element is ensuring a balance between the expenses necessary for the endowment and those intended to provide goods and services for the military personnel. It also seeks to comply with the regulations on public procurement in the field of defense and national security in accordance with those applicable at the European level.

Anticipating and addressing bottlenecks in national defense supply chains requires a collaborative and strategic vision. This involves sharing and aggregating data on demand and production capacity across the European Union.

It is expected that both the production and the import and export of modern military weaponry will continue to increase globally, as each state is interested in maintaining its security. At the same time, the states will continue to invest in high-performance military systems with which they will be able to defend themselves in the context of the outbreak of new international crises.

The military potential of a state is determined by a number of important factors. First, a critical vector is soldier morale and the nation's will to conduct military operations, which influences defensive capabilities and operational capabilities. The size of a country's army and its military equipment are criteria for determining the degree of defense. In addition, a state's military potential is also generated by land, sea, air, space and cyber capabilities.

It is true that a significant increase in defense spending is observed, but there are also stark differences between the states in the East and North of Europe and those in the

South and West, given the geographical positioning of the former much closer to the borders of Ukraine (Dorn et al., 2024b). Moreover, increasing defense spending will not automatically lead to the strengthening of Europe's military capability, as studies show that investments are being made in available systems and platforms, identified over time as insufficient (Dorn, 2024a; Florișteanu, 2023; Saba, 2022). In many cases, Europe's industrial capabilities are either non-existent or insufficient to meet increased defense demand. We inevitably face a situation where this growth is concentrated in the short term and therefore does not stimulate the development of European military and defense capabilities in the long term. As an immediate reaction determined by the urgency of the moment, European states acquire the equipment that is still available and that can be delivered quickly, relying on uncoordinated national decisions that can ultimately lead to the destruction of international security.

So, the distribution of the defense industry corresponds to the degree of general economic development of regions and countries. An important factor preventing the rapid development of the European defense industry is that decisions on defense and security spending are made at the national political level, with each major state having its own national champions of industry, which reduces technological capabilities and limits the ability to share experiences across borders. The development of capabilities is also hindered by the fact that various universities adopt a restrictive attitude towards cooperation with the defense industry.

Conclusions

Member States should consider pooling national defense contributions (Becker et al., 2021), which would require a collective agreement to commit national funds to a joint European initiative, balancing national interests with the broader objective of security and stability in Europe. Concurrent and complementary defense capabilities enhance Europe's strategic autonomy by promoting a robust integrated defense system capable of ensuring a high level of international security. This competition enhances performance, creating a complex mechanism of resilient strategies against opponents and a singular approach to safety. It is crucial that Europe's defense has varied support capabilities and redundancies to address vulnerabilities.

So, the impact of the military crisis between Russia and Ukraine on the military budgets of the member states depends on the countries involved, their proximity to the conflict, their strategic interests. Eastern European countries, especially those bordering Ukraine (Fiott, 2024), have increased military defense spending in response to threats from Russia. Many European countries have prioritized defense modernization to address emerging threats and improve military readiness and capability, including investment in advanced weaponry and cyber security.

Relative to the Nordic countries, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia led to a more unified perception of security threats. The most transformative impact of the war on European defense is in the northern region of Europe. Given the considerable financial strength of these states, additional investment will lead to significant additional military capability.

Regarding the perspective of the defense of the European states for the year 2030, it is observed that Germany, France, Poland and the Baltic states are making major investments in the field of security and defense, which will prove sustainable in the long term (Bergmann et al., 2023). The countries aim to replace significant stockpiles of

equipment that have been supplied to Ukraine, contributing to the modernization of their own military and armed forces.

Of course, Europe has grown its defense spending substantially given the shock of the military crisis, and in the long run the key variable will become less threat perception and interest in economic growth. As such, as long as there is stability from an economic point of view, the sustainability of defense spending will also be maintained, an aspect that contributes to national and international security.

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